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Jane D. Samson* Lord Mansfield and
Negotiable Instruments
In any system of judge-made law the longevity, education and character
of a judge have enhanced significance. The idea of a judge personifies
Justice, blinded and impartial, but the law he creates will inevitably be
infused with his personality. Where an individual develops an entire
system of law, his contribution to legal history can be overwhelming.
Lord Mansfield remains a case in point.
A discussion of the law of negotiable instruments' is the best way to
introduce Lord Mansfield's commercial decisions. His work in this area
represents the culmination of centuries of development in the legal theory
of negotiability. A brief introduction to that development will illustrate
the way in which a specific feature of the law merchant - paper credit
- entered common law through an official recognition of mercantile
custom. For this reason, some of the decisions of Lord Holt, Chief Justice
of the Court of King's Bench 1689-1710, will be included. Holt's
judgments testify to the struggle between mercantile practise and
common law doctrine, and illustrate the pressures put on the Court of
King's Bench by the banking community. Two statutes dealing with
negotiable instruments were passed in 1698 and 1704 respectively; these
will also be discussed to illustrate the statutory context of Mansfield's
work.
It may seem surprising that the central courts had not already
formulated a body of negotiable instruments law before Mansfield's
appointment to the Bench in 1756. One explanation is the activity of
both the Court of Admiralty and local mercantile courts - fair, staple
and borough - before the legal centralisation of the 17th century
attracted commercial litigation to Westmiuster.= The other is that
*M.A. (Legal History), University of Victoria.
1. I propose to deal with the law of bills and notes in particular. The other types of negotiable
instruments, banknotes and cheques for example, were influenced by Mansfield but not
completely settled at law until a later period. The place of cheques in the development of
negotiable instruments law is discussed in J. Milnes Holden, The History of Negotiable
Instruments in English Law 204-243 (1955). The issue of banknotes is discussed in the same
book at 70-72, 87-93 and 196.
2. Space restricts the inclusion of background information. Although considerable literature
exists on the subject of medieval law courts and the development of a "law merchant" apart
from common law, the movement from local, summary courts to centralised, common law
jurisdiction had special relevance for Lord Mansfield. Due to the expansion and consolidation
of common law jurisdiction exemplified by the work of Lord Coke (1552-1634) and increased
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merchants themselves did not develop the concept of negotiability until
the 17th century; before that time the bill of exchange was simply a
means of transferring credit from one person to another. In other words,
the bill represented the personal credit of the drawer and did not have
integral value of its own. There would have been little need for litigation
due to the simplicity of these early bills, since they -were not negotiable
and the number of persons involved was limited. By the first quarter of
the 17th century, however, the custom of merchants accepted both inland
and foreign bills of exchange and promissory notes (known as bills
obligatory) as negotiable.3
Customary usage, enhanced by the proliferation of goldsmith bankers
and their semi-negotiable notes, brought pressure to bear on the English
legal system. The common law position on transferability contrasted with
the situation on the Continent, particularly in France, where notes
payable to bearer were transferable by delivery in order to provide a fully
negotiable instrument for the mercantile community. 4 Merchants of the
early 17th century agitated for the passage of an Act of Parliament to
recognise the free transfer of bills obligatory made payable to the payee
or bearer, claiming that the discrepancy between common and civil law
on this issue was an impediment to commerce.5 The 100-year interval
between the development of fully negotiable instruments in mercantile
custom, and their acceptance at law under Mansfield saw the recognition
of custom as the basis for liability, at least in part.
Toward the end of the 17th century, the mercantile community turned
again to Parliament for solutions. The years since their last lobby for
reform had seen both the development and expansion of the banking
industry, and the resulting machinery associated with modem banking.
Trade was expanding with exploration and the beginnings of Empire6,
use of the action of assumpsit, the Court of King's Bench dominated the commercial field by
the 18th century. This did not mean local, summary courts disappeared completely; see
William Hutton, Courts ofRequests (1806).
3. Compare Gerald Malynes, Lex Mercatorla (1622) with John Marius, Advice Concerning
Bills of Exchange (1651).
4. Proving consideration with each transfer was the main problem. For details, see Holden,
supra, note 1 at 27-29.
5. G. Malynes, supra, note 3 at 71. He lamented the difference in attitude between English and
Continental courts: "Hitherto things are not rightly understood, as it is to be wished it were,
whereby other nations still have an advantage" (at 74). Such legislation was in fact proposed
twice in the 17th century. See W. Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law VI, 151 (1966).
6. Space again restricts the amount of background material given. The author's M.A. thesis,
Jane D. Samson, Ex Aequo Et Bono: Lord Mansfield and Commercial Law (1986) includes
discussion of the economic and institutional contexts of Mansfield's work; more is found in J.
Brewer, J.S. Plumb, N. McKendrick, The Birth of a Consumer Society (1975) and P.G.M.
Dickson, The FinancialRevolution in England 1688-1756 (1967).
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and the powerful commercial lobby was able to achieve the passage of a
statute regulating the legal position of bills of exchange in 1698.7
The legislation of 1698 recognised mercantile custom regarding
foreign bills, but clearly stated that its purpose was "for the better
payment of inland bills of exchange." It indicated that the acceptor of a
bill was bound to pay it, and that non-payment was to be formally
protested before a notary public and two witnesses. The acceptor of the
bill was to receive this protest within 14 days. If all this was done, the
defaulter became liable for costs, damages and interest. Further, if a bill
was lost or misdirected, the drawer was obliged to reissue the bill only if
the drawee gave security to indemnify him should the original be found.
It is important that such conditional assignability did not yet extend to
promissory notes.
The judgments of Lord Holt, Chief Justice of the Court of King's
Bench 1689-1710, were made after the passage of this statute and testify
further to the struggle between mercantile practise and common law
doctrine. Holt rendered many judgments on commercial matters: of 56
commercial cases heard by him, 23 concerned bills of exchange or
promissory notes, a large number which reflected growing pressure
placed on the Court of King's Bench by the commercial community.8
Although Holt did much to clarify commercial issues in his court, his
antagonistic attitude toward the City, particularly the banking
community, was severe and protracted. This legacy helped shape
Mansfield's priorities because he realised that cooperation among
merchants, businessmen and his court was vital to his reform work. Holt's
decisions also constitute a summary of the state of negotiable instruments
law immediately prior to Mansfield's term of office.
Briefly, Holt refused to allow promissory notes, or bills obligatory, to
be sued upon, regardless of mercantile custom. He quite rightly realised
that notes and bills had been confused in previous judgments, and that
notes had benefitted from this confusion by absorbing the negotiable
character of inland bills of exchange. In the case Clerke v. Martin (1702),
Holt insisted:
... that the maintaining of these actions upon such notes were innovations
upon the rules of the Common Law, and invested in Lombard-Street,
which attempted in these matters of bills of exchange, to give law to
Westminster Hall.9
7. 9 k 10 William and Mary, c 15 (1698).
8. These statistics are taken from Holt's Reports. The compiler of these reports is believed to
have been Giles Jacob, author of several editions of the 18th century Law Dictionary. Hot's
Reports claims to be a combination of Holt's cases scattered throughout other reports, and is
probably the most comprehensive selection available for statistical purposes.
9. Ld. Raym. 757,92 Engl. Rep. 6.
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He added that the practise of declaring upon promissory notes in actions
upon the case, on the law merchant, "proceeded from obstinacy and
opinionativeness,"'10 and previous judgments made in such cases were
bad law.
Holt's objection was not to the recognition of negotiability in
promissory notes - that was firmly established - but to declaring upon
them in the same manner as bills of exchange. This position brought Holt
into direct conflict with the bankers of the City, who had thought the law
was settled.
The timely enactment of another statute, 3 & 4 Anne (1704) put an
end to the controversy by declaring that "Promissory notes are enacted to
be assignable by indorsement; and actions might be maintained thereon,
in like sort as was enacted on inland bills of exchange in the year 1698."
This could not have been coincidental; Holt's treatment of promissory
notes provoked the mercantile community into lobbying once again for
government intervention. An increase in business and in the use of
negotiable instruments meant an increase in litigation, and it is clear that,
before Mansfield's appointment as Chief Justice, the failure of common
law to provide speedy, consistent justice on all mercantile contracts had
forced Parliament to intervene. Mansfield would confront the task of
clarifying the legal status of negotiable instruments and bringing common
law into line with statutory requirements.
General comments on Mansfield's judicial style will introduce his
decisions in negotiable instruments law. He was deeply concerned about
the reception of his judgments by the merchants of the City, and stressed
the need for certainty in commercial law for their benefit. In Millar v.
Race, a suit on banknotes, "Lord Mansfield said he would not wish to
have it understood in the City that the court had any doubt upon the
point."" On another occasion he ordered a retrial because he had
"learned since that the people in the City were dissatisfied with the
verdict."12 Sensitivity to the requirements of commerce underscored all of
Mansfield's decisions, motivating him to provide practical legal solutions
to mercantile problems. Stylistic analysis of a leading negotiable
instruments case, Heylyn v. Adamson (1758)13 illustrates his pragmatic
approach to judgment.
Mansfield prefaced his decision with a statement determining his
priorities: "... it must now be determined upon the nature of the
10. Id.
11. 2 Burr. 669,97 Eng. Rep. 503 (1758).
12. Lilly v. Ewer (1779), 1 Dougl. 74,99 Eng. Rep. 178.
13. Supra, note 11.
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transaction, general convenience, and the authority of deliberate
resolutions in Court."'1 4 He then defined the terms of reference in the case
(on a bill of exchange) on the basis of the usages of trade. During his
discussion of foreign and inland bills, he concluded that there was no
difference except for the inconvenience of distance in the latter, and "All
the arguments from law, and the nature of a transaction, are exactly the
same in both cases.' 15 He continued:
For, the design of the law of merchants in distinguishing these from all
other contracts, by making them assignable, was for the convenience of
commerce, that they might pass from hand to hand in the way of trade, in
the same manner as if they were specie. Now, to require a demand upon
the drawer, will be laying such a clog upon these bills, as will deter every
body from taking them.16
After reviewing all the leading cases in the matter and commenting on the
confusion in reported terminology, he gave judgment according both to
the traditional mercantile interpretation of bills of exchange, and to
statute. Mansfield's decisions were characterised by concern for the
specific needs of commerce, in his own words: "These contracts are to be
taken with great latitude: the strict letter of the contract is not to be so
much regarded, as the object and intention of it.' 17 Mercantile courts had
always been practical and swift; Mansfield accordingly concentrated on
intentions rather than legal details.18 Moreover, the "great latitude" of
interpretation implied an equitable attitude, and reliance on the natural
justice of the situation.
Mansfield's catholic education and knowledge of civilian law
influenced his judicial attitude considerably.' 9 He knew that until the
mid-17th century the Court of Admiralty had been the principal central
institution of the Law Merchant and was prepared to accept its rules in
his own court where necessary. In the case Anthon v. Fisher (1782)20
Lord Mansfield permitted civilian experts to conduct the argument. Since
14. Id., at 674 and 506.
15. Id., at 675 and 506.
16. Id.
17. Hothan v. EastIndia Company (1779), 1 Dougl. 272,99 Eng. Rep. 178.
18. See note 2, supra.
19. Mansfield's education and its influence on his judicial attitude was crucial. In addition to
the usual classics-oriented training at Christchurch and Oxford, Mansfield - then William
Murray - acquired a diversified legal education by working both in Chancery and in Scottish
appeals (he himself was a Scot) to the House of Lords before his election to the House of
Commons and appointment as Solicitor General. Throughout his judgments, knowledge of
equity, foreign law and jurisprudential theory is evident. Mansfield's education and the
intellectual context of his time are explored in Samson, "The Tools of Reform: Mansfield and
Natural Law," supra, note 6, at 15-33.
20. 3 Dougl. 166,99 Eng. Rep. 594.
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the case involved ransom bills and rules of the law of nations, Mansfield
said, "I wish this case to be spoken to by civilians. We can have no light
from our own law. '21 He added that he had already investigated the
French Ordinnance de la Marine himself.
This raises the issue of judicial notice. Mansfield once said: "I never
give a judicial opinion upon any point, until I think I am master of every
material argument and authority relative to it."' ' In the marine insurance
case Goss v. Withers (1758)23 he declared:
I have taken the trouble to inform myself of the Practise of the Court of
Admiralty in England, before any Act of Parliament commanded
restitution, or fixed the rate of salvage: and I have talked with Sir George
Lee, who has examined the books of the Court of Admiralty .... 24
He recognised the historical significance of Admiralty practise in
commercial cases even when it meant stepping outside the common law.
In Lewis v. Rucker (1761) he had "conversed with gentlemen of
experience in adjustments," s and in Glover v. Black (1763) he found "by
talking with intelligent persons very conversant in the knowledge and
practise of insurance, that they always do mention such interest whenever
they mean to insure it."26 Such liberal use of judicial notice indicated
tremendous determination, even daring, as well as recognition of the
limited resources of common law on mercantile issues. Throughout
Mansfield's decisions, concern for the interests of trade was paramount,
balanced by a belief in the potential of common law to uphold those
interests. By allowing his court to be informed by the principles of natural
justice, the practise and doctrine of other courts, and the customs of
merchants themselves, Mansfield realised that potential.
The case of Heylyn v. Adamson (1758)27 set the stage for Mansfield's
clarification of commercial law by, among other things, addressing
terminological confusion in the reported cases. Unfamiliar with the
technical vocabulary of commerce (a traditional complaint of
merchants), court reporters of the 17th and early 18th centuries had used
the terms "bill" and "note" indiscriminately in their accounts. Lambert v.
Oakes (1700)28 was the example used by Mansfield. It was reported three
21. Cited in Julius J. Marke (1977), "Lord Mansfield and the Common Law," 197 Vignettes
of Legal History.
22. Goss v. Withers, 2 Burr. 683,97 Eng. Rep. 511.
23. Id., at 694 and 518.
24. See John Holliday, Life of William Late Earl of Mansfield (1797) at ix where he indicated
Mansfield and Sir James Marriott, another Admiralty judge, were close friends.
25. 2 Burr. 1167.
26. 3 Burr. 1394.
27. Supra, note 11.
28. 1 Ld. Raym. 443, 91 Eng. Rep. 1194, 1 Salk. 127, 100 Eng. Rep. 119, 12 Mod. 244, 88
Eng. Rep. 1293.
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times, twice as a case upon a bill of exchange, and once upon a
promissory note. Mansfield inherited the resulting confusion. Realising
the importance of this case, the court postponed judgment, a rare event
during Mansfield's tenure, "in order to settle the point with precision and
certainty." 29
When he gave judgment on the case, Mansfield explained that once a
promissory note had been endorsed, increasing the number of parties
involved to three, there was little to distinguish it from a bill of
exchange.3 0 Most of the confusion in terminology was due to the fact that
reporters mistook the "drawers" of bills for the "makers" of notes when
three persons were involved. Mansfield resolved the problem by
distinguishing between bills of exchange that had not been endorsed, and
those that had. There were three original parties to a bill, and liability for
payment moved from the drawer to the drawee once the drawee agreed
to pay the bill. Not only was it inconvenient to seek out the original
drawer, it was legally unnecessary. There were two original parties to a
promissory note, and Mansfield agreed that at this point the payee had no
recourse but to sue the original maker of the note for payment. This was
the point that had caused all the confusion: the mixup in terms had led
counsel to believe that the payee of a bill also needed to sue the original
drawer.
The specific point at issue in Heylyn had been whether the plaintiffs
had shown due diligence in attempting to obtain payment from the
drawer of the bill before bringing a suit against the endorser. Lord
Mansfield stated that the law "must now be determined upon the nature
of the transaction, general convenience, and the authority of deliberate
resolutions in Court" 31 As previously noted, this order of priority was
typical of him. First Mansfield showed that the drawer of a bill of
exchange was released from liability once the bill was accepted for
payment. Bearing in mind the interest of trade, he reminded the court
that, even if the drawer could be sued, it would be highly inconvenient
in the case of foreign bills. Moreover, the fact that bills of exchange were
endorsed and handed on had to absolve earlier parties from
responsibility, or the purpose of the instrument would be defeated. There
must be complete assignment, or the flow of credit would be interrupted.
Mansfield concluded by summing up the proper treatment of both bills
of exchange and promissory notes:
29. 2 Burr. 673,97 Eng. Rep. 505.
30. Id., at 676 and 507.
31. Id., at 674 and 506.
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Therefore, before the indorsee of a promissory note brings an action
against the indorser, he npst shew a demand, or due diligence to get the
money from the maker of'the note; just as the person to whom the bill of
exchange is made payable must shew a demand, or due diligence to get the
money from the acceptor, before he brings an action against the drawer.32
Certain aspects of negotiability also needed Mansfield's attention,
including the issue of mistaken or omitted wording on bills. His judgment
in the case Edie v. East India Company (1761) 33 is characteristically
pragmatic, concerned with the intentions of persons involved, and the
equitable conclusions to be drawn from those intentions to inform the
law.
A bill of exchange had been drawn by Colonel Clive on the East India
Company in favour of Mr. Campbell or his order, and Campbell had
endorsed the bill to Robert Ogilby with the words "or order" left out of
the endorsement. Ogilby then endorsed the bill to the plaintiff and went
bankrupt. The question before the court was whether the plaintiff had to
bear the loss, or whether Campbell was liable, since he had neglected to
include the words "to order."
Mansfield took a drastic but logical step in his resolution of the case.
He declared a bill of exchange to be negotiable "in its original creation,"
not in its wording. He pointed out the fact that interest in bills and notes
is transferable to executors or administrators without anything of the sort
being noted on the instrument itself. Common sense and the requirements
of trade dictated that bills of exchange needed to be fully negotiable in
order to serve their purpose, and details of wording were secondary to
that purpose. Mansfield knew that the life of an instrument of credit
depended on its universal acceptance. Merchants had to -be sure their bills
or notes would command the same respect everywhere, and that their
intentions would receive a higher priority than mistaken wording. In
another case, Mansfield summarized his pragmatic approach to
commercial law thus:
In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty; and
therefore it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain than
whether the rule is established one way or the other: because speculators
in trade then know which ground to go upon.34
He insisted that the law act not as the master of commerce, but as its
servant.
32. Id., at 676-677 and 507.
33. 2 Burr. 1216, 97 Eng. Rep. 796.
34. Vallejo v. Wheeler(1774), I Cowp. 143,98 Eng. Rep. 1012.
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Edie was important for another reason. By it the process of
amalgamation between the custom of merchants and the common law
reached its conclusion. The Court of King's Bench had allowed the
testimony of merchants in order to prove mercantile custom on a
particular point ever since Oaste v. Taylor (1612). 35 The complicated
rules of contract law, including the necessity of proving consideration
with each new transfer of a bill of exchange, had produced enormously
long declarations. In Oaste, the plaintiff pleaded the custom of merchants
which recognised the free transfer of bills and notes by endorsement, thus
avoiding the need to conform to the regular rules of contract. The law
merchant had made its entrance into the common law of negotiable
instruments. A later case, Carter v. Downish (1687)36 established that the
custom of merchants bound all those who employed their contracts,
whether they were merchants themselves or not. The rules of the law
merchant with respect to negotiable instruments did not have to be
specifically pleaded. The judgment in Carter declared:
That the custom of merchants is not a particular custom and local, but it
is of an universal extent, and is a general law of the land. The pleading
here is good; for if an action be brought against an innkeeper on common
carrier, it is usual to declare secundum legem et consuetudinem Angliae;
for it is not a custom confined to a particular place, but it is such which
is extensive to all the King's people. The word "consuetudo" might have
been added, but it imports no more than '7ex," for custom itself is law.37
What had formerly been a custom restricted to merchants and required
to be specifically pleaded was now part of common law, applicable to
everyone.
The link with Mansfield's judgment in Edie involved the testimony of
merchants on mercantile custom. In the original trial, Mansfield had
permitted such testimony to contradict the principle that
... the bill of exchange originally made assignable and negotiable, and
being in its own nature assignable must continue always so; and that the
law will interpret the assignment to be made in the same manner in which
the bill is drawn, although the words "or order" be omitted.38
Mansfield cited several cases involving foreign bills in which the omission
had not restricted negotiability, concluding that he had been mistaken in
allowing merchant witnesses to sway the jury. One witness in particular,
a cashier of the Bank of England, had testified that his bank usually
35. Litt. 363, 124 Eng. Rep. 286. For a detailed study of mercantile custom, see Robert W.
Aske, The Law Relating to Custom and the Usages of Trade (1909).
36. 3 Mod. 226,87 Eng. Rep. 1602.
37. Id., at 229 and 147.
38. 2 Burr. 1219,97 Eng. Rep. 799.
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refused to discount bills for a third party unless "or order" was specified.
Lord Mansfield decided that "the jury have found directly contrary to the
settled law," and that a new trial must be ordered:
For the custom of merchants is part of the law of England: and the law of
England being already fully settled on this point, no evidence in
contradiction to it ought to have been admitted; nor can any finding of a
jury alter it09
This cutting off of testimony regarding issues already dealt with served to
give consistency to the law of negotiable instruments, and as Mansfield
frequently noted, consistency was the essence of commercial law. The
custom of merchants, formerly invoked as part of the law of the realm in
relevant cases and often in the face of common law rules, was now
forming precedents of its own. It is notable that Mansfield, conscious as
he was of the interests of trade, did not accept professional testimony
without question; his purpose was to make the law consistent, and this
sometimes required him to treat such testimony with caution.
Two related cases resolved the problems presented by instruments
made payable to payee or bearer, or to bearer alone. Merchants
themselves had been reluctant to accept such bill or notes, and common
law had refused to recognise them.40 Yet it is clear from the works of
Malynes and Marius, and from the introduction of Bank of England notes
in 1694, that bearer bills were popular.41 Mansfield, always interested in
the advancement of trade, realised that the prejudice against bearer bills
was retarding the development of a potentially important form of paper
credit. The two leading cases involved are Miller v. Race (1758)42 and
Grant v. Vaughan (1764).43 Although Grant is the later case, it deals with
the general principles and will be analysed first.
The defendant Vaughan, a London merchant, drew an inland bill on
his banker to pay a certain amount to the master of the ship Fortune, or
to bearer. The shipmaster, Bicknell, lost the bill and it was found by an
unidentified person who used it to buy tea at the shop of Grant, the
plaintiff. In the meantime Vaughan had stopped payment on the bill after
hearing of its loss. Grant accordingly sued Vaughan for payment of the
note. A special jury of merchants found for Vaughan since bills of
39. Id., at 1226 and 802.
40. It was felt that "this custom to pay the bearer was too general," Horton v. Coggs (1689),
3 Lev. 299, 83 Eng. Rep. 698). See also Nicholson v. Sedgwick (1698), 1 Ld. Raym. 180, 100
Eng. Rep. 1016.
41. The Bank of England sidestepped the problem of the negotiability of notes in favour of
bearer by ensuring that all their notes were under seal. Contracts under seal had always been
respected at law. See: Ways and Means Act, s. 29 (1694).
42. 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398.
43. 3 Burr. 1516, 97 Eng. Rep. 957.
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exchange drawn to bearer were unknown (whereas promissory notes
drawn to payee or bearer were quite common). The present case was an
appeal to the whole court. Mansfield stated at the outset that the type of
instrument at issue was irrelevant, since the statute 3 & 4 Anne had
placed both bills of exchange and promissory notes on an equal footing
before the law, and had also recognised the validity of notes made out to
payee or bearer. Therefore the findings of the jury as to the custom of
making the bills of exchange payable to bearer did not influence the law
regarding their validity:
It is enough for the plaintiff that this note was negotiable. The bearer must
prevail against the drawer in some mode of action; having come by it
fairly and honestly. Since the Act the fair holder of a note payable to
bearer may, by the express words of the Act, maintain an action against
the drawer: otherwise, the Act would not put promissory notes upon the
same foot with inland bills of exchange, as it professes to do .... And the
interests of commerce require this determination."
Mansfield noted once again the confusion of terminology in the Reports
when precedents were sought, but maintained that 3 & 4 Anne had
placed all negotiable instruments in the same position. The finder of a
bearer bill had to be able to sue upon it or:
there might be no relief at all. And it can never be supposed reasonable or
legal, that the banker should have it left in his discretion or choice, to pay
the money to one or the other as his fancy or inclination should lead him.45
This is important. By establishing the claim of any finder who cashed a
bearer bill in good faith and for value, Mansfield was taking a step
beyond the old practise of transfer by endorsement. Clearly, the drawer
of a bill could not anticipate the identity of the "bearer" included on his
bill, and therefore endorsement could not be made to him. The only
method of transfer available for a bearer was delivery - the physical
finding and presentation of the note - and at last English commercial
law officially accepted the mercantile community's need for a freely
negotiable form of paper credit.
It is possible to trace the influence of both Lord Hardwicke and Lord
Holt in Mansfield's keen perception of the importance of bearer bills for
commerce. Mansfield referred to the judgment of Hardwicke in the case
Walmesley v. Child (1749)46 in Chancery, in which the Lord Chancellor
maintained that "no dispute ought to be made with the bearer of a
cashnote, who comes fairly by it; for the sake of commerce, to which the
44. Id., at 1522 and 960.
45. Id., at 1523 and 961.
46. Mansfield's description of the case is the only report extant.
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discrediting such notes might be very detrimental. T47 Mansfield, then
William Murray, was working in Chancery at the time and his
admiration for Hardwicke, combined with his concern for the increase of
commerce, must have ensured that this case made an impression on him.
An earlier anonymous case heard by Lord Holt in 1699 addressed the
same issue.45 The judgment recognised the claim of a bonafide holder of
a bill for value "by reason of the course of trade, which creates a property
in the assignee or bearer. '49
Grant requires one more comment. It is clear that, in this case,
Mansfield felt no conflict with statutory law, using it to uphold
mercantile acceptance of bearer bills over the sworn practise of the Bank
of England. However, even in certain areas of marine insurance law
where Mansfield profoundly disagreed with the dictates of Parliament, he
consistently upheld the statutes without hesitation.50 Perhaps he felt that
a consistent cooperation at all levels would be the only way to forge for
England the system of commercial law she so badly needed.
The outcome of Grant v. Vaughan was a new trial, and Mansfield
noted that in his opinion, Bicknell should be held liable for Grant's loss,
since he was the original payee and the amount of money specified in the
bill had been effectively transferred to him upon the drawing of it.
Miller v. Race, although an earlier case, applied the same principles to
a more specialised and far newer type of negotiable instrument, the bank
note.51 It was an action of trover for a bank note, payable to William
Finney or bearer, which had been stolen from the mail and cashed for
value by the plaintiff in the course of his business. Miller had no idea the
note had been stolen. When Finney discovered the theft he ordered
payment to be stopped on the note, and the plaintiff was unable to cash
the note. The defendant, a cashier of the bank, also refused to redeliver
the note to the plaintiff and therefore was sued in trover.
The present case was an appeal to the whole court, and Lord
Mansfield believed the issue to be so important that he postponed
judgment in order to look into all the cases. Concerned about his
reputation for certainty with the London merchants, he added that "at the
same time... I would not wish to have it understood in the City that the
Court had any doubt about the point."52 Moreover, when he delivered his
judgment he made it clear that he had based his decision "upon the
47. Cited in 3 Burr. 1525, 97 Eng. Rep. 961.
48. 1 Salk. 126,3 Salk. 71, 1 Ld. Raym. 738.
49. Id.
50. See Samson, "Mansfield and Marine Insurance," supra, note 6 at 125-157.
51. See note 1, supra.
52. 1 Burr. 457,97 Eng. Rep. 401.
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general course of business, and from the consequences to trade and
commerce: which would be much incommoded by a contrary
determination." 53
During the first hearing of the case, the special jury had found that "in
the common and known course of trade, bank notes are paid by and
received of the holder or possessor of them, as cash; and that in the usual
way of negotiating bank notes, they pass from one person to another as
cash, by delivery only . .. "54 There could be no question that the bearer
of a bank note made payable to bearer, if he received the note in good
faith and for value, should be able to cash it. Mansfield referred to the
Chancery case Walmsley v. Child in this judgment also, concluding:
A bank-note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad,
treated as money, as cash; and paid and received, as cash; and it is
necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their currency should be
established and secured.55
The history of an instrument could not affect the title of a bona fide
holder.
Another case, Peacock v. Rhodes (1781), 6 dealt with a stolen bill of
exchange, this time endorsed in blank, in the same way. Mansfield found
himself in the agreeable position of being cited twice as a precedent, and
found judgement accordingly. His summation included an excellent
overview of all the legal issues surrounding a stolen note payable to
bearer, or endorsed in blank:
The holder of a bill of exchange, or promissory note, is not to be
considered in the light of an assignee of the payee. An assignee must take
the thing assigned, subject to all the equity to which the original party was
subject. If this rule applied to bills and promissory notes, it would stop
their currency. The law is settled, that a holder, coming fairly by a bill or
note, has nothing to do with the transaction between the original parties
.... I see no difference between a note indorsed blank and one payable to
bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in both
cases
57
Emphasis on practical results underscored Mansfield's judicial style.
His concern for the advancement of trade, his sensitivity to the needs of
merchants, his gifts of organisation and clarity of expression, all brought
the development of English negotiable instruments law into accord with
the usage of trade. A keen awareness of the importance of universal
53. Id.
54. Id., at 452 and 398.
55. Id., at 459 and 402.
56. 2 Dougl. 633,99 Eng. Rep. 402.
57. Id., at 636 and 403.
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certainty prompted Mansfield to mold the law to commercial needs,
rather than force those needs into legal restrictions. No doubt his Scottish
background and Chancery experience helped him to know that
mercantile custom was consistent throughout Europe and beyond, at
least on the issue of negotiable instruments, and that the court he
inherited needed firm direction in order to make Efiglish commercial law
reflect its requirements. Knowing that the records were confused and
misleading, he laid down practical, coherent definitions for the guidance
of proceedings, insisting that the intentions of the parties to a negotiable
instrument be given first priority. Where the law could make a technical
objection, as in Edie v. East India Company, Mansfield let natural justice
carry the day. As he said in another negotiable instruments case Alderson
v. Temple (1768):58
... I choose to put the case upon that ground, because the most desirable
object in all judicial determinations, especially in mercantile ones, (which
ought to be determined upon natural justice, and not upon the niceties of
law), is, to do substantial justice.59
In Mansfield's court, merchants found a sympathetic hearing which
contrasted sharply with their experience of Lord Holt, and Mansfield
found in the muddled reports a task equal to his enthusiasm and talents.
There was plenty of scope for both during his career: Mansfield heard
167 cases on bills of exchange and 292 on promissory notes at Nisi Pnus
alone,60 out of a total of 691 commercial cases. The number of cases on
notes is particularly striking and testifies to the popularity of this form of
paper credit. Cases on notes increased in number throughout the period
of Mansfield's appointment, soaring from seven in the period 1756-1760
to 61 in 1766-1770. The total for the yeats 1781-1798 was 103 cases,
and since Mansfield was often ill during the last two years, that figure
might have been higher. Cases on bills of exchange follow the same
pattern. It is a compliment to Mansfield that, relative to these increases,
the number of cases appealed to the full court declined. Clearly
Mansfield's decisions carried weight, and his search for certainty in law
and predictability in practise was a successful one.
The number of cases did not only relate to increased trade in
negotiable instruments, but also to the reputation of the presiding judge.
Sympathetic, equitable, meticulous and articulate, Lord Mansfield was
able to make sense of a very confused and uncertain aspect of the law
58. 4 Burr. 2235, 98 Eng. Rep. 165.
59. Id., at 2239 and 167.
60. Fifty-Six Judges' Notebooks. Mansfield's unpublished court notebooks remain the
property of the present Earl of Mansfield, who kindly consented to let me examine them.
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with an eye to encouraging trade and commerce. He made himself the
literal and legal turning-point for the subject. Such a blend of scholarship
and pragmatism could not fail to impress, and Mansfield's illumination of
the law of negotiable instruments inspired two contemporaries to collect
his decisions. Peter Lovelass, a lawyer, produced "a full, clear and
familiar explanation of the law upon Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes" in 1798, the year after Mansfield's death. It began:
The genius of Lord Mansfield and the numerous suits commenced and
prosecuted in the courts of law even within these last 20 years, for
determining the properties, nature and effects of paper credit, are
indisputably loud calls for a work of this kind.61
Another book was published in 1789, Sir John Bayley's Short Treatise
on the Law of Bills of Exchange.62 He too assented that Mansfield's
achievements in this area of the law should not go unchronicled.
What Mansfield's judgments reveal is the way in which mercantile
custom regarding negotiable instruments entered common law,
illustrating the interplay of commercial demand and legal procedure.
More generally we can observe the influence of personality on
lawmaking. It was the force and purpose of Lord Mansfield's character
and talents, along with his cultivation of cooperation between law and
layman, which made his court a forum for redefinition and reform.
61. Peter Lovelass, A Full Clear and Familiar Explanation of the Law Concerning Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes, Preface (1789).
62. Preface: "The many modem determinations upon the law of Bills and Notes, and the
importance of an intimate acquaintance with the principles of these determinations, is a
sufficient apology for an attempt to collect and methodize them.'
